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Three Solutions to the
Knower Paradox
Francesca Poggiolesi
In this paper I shall present three solutions to the Knower
Paradox which, despite important points in common, differ
in several respects. The first solution, proposed by C. A.
Anderson [1] is a hierarchical solution, developed in the
framework of first-order arithmetic. However I will try to
show that this solution is based on an incorrect argument.
The second solution, inspired by a book of R.M. Smullyan
[14], is developed in the framework of modal logic and it is
based on the idea of interpreting one of the basic systems
of the modal logic of provability in an epistemic way. I
shall give arguments in support of this solution. The third
solution, proposed by P. Egrèé [8] attempts to connect the
first and the second solutions. I will show that this attempt
fails for philosophical and formal reasons.
Keywords: hierarchy solutions, Knower Paradox, provabil-
ity logic, self-reference.
1. Two versions of the Knower Paradox
The Knower Paradox was introduced in 1960 by Kaplan and
Montague [9] and basically is the epistemological counterpart
of the Liar Paradox. I will start by presenting it in its original
version, the one which treats knowledge as a predicate attached
to names of sentences and uses the framework of first order
arithmetic.
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Let then T be a theory which extends Robinson Arithmetic
(see, for example, [4], pp. 110) and satisfies the following three
conditions.
First Condition. T can prove the fixed point lemma.
The fixed point lemma. For every formula P(x) of L(T), with
one free variable x, there exists a sentence α of L(T) such that
T ` α↔ P (α) (where the overlining of a sentence stands in for
Gödel numeral of that sentence).
Proof. See [4], pp. 167.
Second Condition. T contains an arithmetical predicate I(x, y)
meaning that the sentence with Gödel number x is derivable
from the sentence with Gödel number y, the Gödel numbering
being given in advance. Note that in T we can formalize the
proof predicate Bew(x), normally defined as ∃y.ProofT (y, x),
which satisfies the rule (for the proof see [2], pp. 43):
` α ⇒ ` Bew(α)
From this fact it follows that if T satisfies the deduction theo-
rem, then I(α, β) is expressible as Bew(α→ β).
Third Condition. T contains a unary predicate K(x) meaning
that the truth of the sentence with Gödel number x is known
and satisfying, for every sentence α and β of L(T):
K(α)→ α, the reflection principle (RP),
K(K(α)→ α), assumption number two (AT),
K(α) ∧ I(α, β)→ K(β), epistemic closure (EC).
Note that if T satisfies the deduction theorem and it contains
the rule R.K.:
` α ⇒ ` K(α)
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then the principle of epistemic closure can be expressed in the
following alternative form:
K(α→ β)→ (K(α)→ K(β)), epistemic closure (EC1).
The Knower Paradox. If the theory T satisfies these three con-
ditions, then T is inconsistent.
Proof. By the fixed point lemma, there is a sentence ¬p of L(T)
such that:
(1) T ` ¬p↔ ¬K(¬p)
(2) T ` ¬¬p↔ ¬¬K(¬p), by contraposition from (1),
(3) T ` p↔ K(¬p), by logic from (2),
(4) (RP ) `T K(¬p)→ ¬p,
(5) (RP ) `T p→ ¬p, by transitivity from (3) and (4),
(6) (RP ) `T ¬p, by logic from (5),
(7) T ` I(RP,¬p), from what precedes,
(8) (AT ) `T K(RP ),
(9) (EC) `T K(RP ) ∧ I(RP,¬p)→ K(¬p),
(10) (EC), (AT ) `T K(¬p), by M. P. form (7), (8), (9),
(11) (EC), (AT ) `T p, by logic from (10) and (3).
(12) (EC), (AT ), (RP ) `T p ∧ ¬p, combining (11) with (6).
(q.e.d.)
Even if the Knower Paradox in its original formulation was
presented as a Paradox affecting the framework of first-order
arithmetic, it can be easily reproduced in the framework of
modal logic.
Let L be a normal system of modal logic in the modal lan-
guage L: so L contains all tautologies, all instances of the dis-
tribution axiom schemata K [2(α → β) → (2α → 2β)], it is
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closed under modus ponens and the rule of necessitation R.N.
[` α ⇒ ` 2α] and it satisfies the deduction theorem. Let L∗
a modal system in the modal language L∗ that satisfies the
following two conditions.
First condition. L∗ extends L by proving a fixed point lemma.
The modal fixed point lemma. For every L - formula α(p, q1, ..., qn),
in which every occurrence of p is in the scope of some occurrence
of 2, there exists a sentence β(q1, ..., qn), where β contains no
sentence letter except q1, ..., qn and p is distinct from the qi’s,
such that:
L∗ ` β(q1, ..., qn)↔ α(β(q1, ..., qn), q1, ..., qn).
Proof. See, [2], pp. 141-145.
Second Condition. L∗ contains the axiom schemata, T:2α→ α
Let us make three observations. Firstly, T is quite obviously
the modal counterpart of the reflection principle; it suffices to
substitute in the reflection principle K by 2, to obtain T:
K(α)→ α  2α→ α
Secondly, if L∗ contains T and the rule of necessitation, then
L∗ also contains the axiom schemata U: 2(2α → α), which is
the modal counterpart of the assumption number two. Again
it suffices to substitute in the assumption number two K by 2,
to obtain U:
K(K(α)→ α)  2(2α→ α)
Thirdly, as L∗ contains the distribution axiom schemata and
the rule of necessitation, then L∗ contains the modal counter-
part of the principle of epistemic closure in his alternative form
(EC1). It suffices to substitute in the rule R.K. and in EC1
K by 2, to obtain the rule R.N. and the distribution axiom
schemata K:
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` α ⇒ ` K(α)  ` α ⇒ ` 2α
K(α→ β)→ (K(α)→ K(β))  2(α→ β)→ (2α→ 2β)
The Knower Paradox in the Framework of Modal Logic. If L∗
satisfies these two conditions, then L∗ is inconsistent.
Proof. This result follows immediately from the inconsistency
result just derived in the first-order arithmetic theory.
2. Two important points common to the three solutions
The aim of this article is to present three solutions to the
Knower Paradox. These solutions agree on the following two
points. Firstly, they agree on the source of the Paradox. In
order to solve the Paradox, we must find an actual mistake in
the argument. This can be: a fallacious assumption, an invalid
inference or an inconsistent theory (or system). Given that the
theory T (or the system L∗) is supposed to be consistent, or at
least possibly consistent, and the proof is trivially valid, then
one of the three assumptions, namely RP, AT and EC (or their
modal counterparts, namely T, U and K) must be at fault and
consequently, to avoid the Paradox, we have to renounce to one
of them. The three solutions agree that the assumption number
two is the source of the contradiction and I want to give three
reasons which support this claim.
Firstly, the other two assumptions are relatively difficult to
doubt, if we attentively analyze them. A recent and really inter-
esting result of C.B. Cross [6] and [7] tells us that we can prove
the Knower Paradox without an explicit epistemic closure. If
we can derive the Knower Paradox without the epistemic clo-
sure, then we can draw two conclusions: the first is that the
principle of epistemic closure can’t be the source of the Para-
dox, the second is that the culprit of the contradiction has to
be the reflection principle or the assumption number two. Let
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us then analyze these two assumptions. The reflection principle
is the most natural and intuitive one. More, it’s supported by
our standard conception of knowledge, the one which defines
knowledge as 〈〈justified true belief〉〉, which has been firstly in-
troduced by Plato in the Theaetetus (see, e.g., [5]). As we do
want to preserve this conception of knowledge, we can’t refuse
the reflection principle. So, it is useless to reject the principle
of epistemic closure because the contradiction can be proved
without it; it is implausible to reject the reflection principle
without rejecting knowledge itself; hence the only assumption
we can reject, to avoid the Knower Paradox, is the assumption
number two.
Furthermore there are two arguments that suggest that the
assumption number two is the source of the Paradox. The first
argument relies on the analogy with provability and the Gödel’s
second theorem. Let’s consider the three assumptions which are
satisfied in the formal system T : the principle of reflection, the
assumption number two and the principle of epistemic closure.
If we substitute in every assumption the knowledge predicate
K by the provability predicate Bew, we obtain:
Bew(α)→ α,
Bew(Bew(α)→ α),
Bew(α) ∧Bew(α, β)→ Bew(β)
But Bew(¬Bew(⊥)), which contradicts the Gödel’s second
theorem, is just an instance of Bew(Bew(α)→ α). Therefore,
quoting Anderson ([1], p. 350), 〈〈 the thing that’s false for Q is
the analogue of the assumption number two. Shouldn’t we do
the analogous thing for our case? 〉〉
The second argument is based on the form of the three as-
sumptions. The reflection principle and the epistemic closure
describe some conditions and features of knowledge: the for-
mer says that if something is known, then it is so; the latter
says that if β is derivable from α and α is known, then β is
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known. As we can trivially see, they do not say anything about
what we really do know, whereas the assumption number two
affirms knowledge of something (the reflection principle). This
difference of shape could be a good sign for believing that the
assumption we have to rule out is the second one. As Anderson
says ([1], p. 350), 〈〈None of this is conclusive. Probably there’s
a more convincing argument here somewhere, but I can’t find
it 〉〉.
Having presented the first point common to the three solu-
tions, let us now pass to introduce the second one. Such point
relates to the notion of knowledge. Indeed each of the three
solutions to the Knower Paradox treats knowledge as if it were
intimately connected with the notion of proof. They thus seem
to deal with a more limited and abstract notion of knowledge
than that which is generally accepted; so they appear as solu-
tions to the the Paradox of a Mathematical Knower, and not
the Paradox of an Ordinary Knower. As we will see in the
fourth section the main difference between Anderson’s solution
and the one offered by the modal logic of provability is based
on this point: while Anderson appears to confuse two different
notions of proof by which we obtain knowledge, the logic of
provability uses a unique and clear notion of proof.
3. The first solution: Anderson’s solution
Anderson’s solution, published in 1983 in the Journal of Phi-
losophy, is, as we will see, a hierarchical solution expressed in
the frame of first order arithmetic.
In order to be able to present Anderson’s solution, we have,
first of all, to consider a language Q∗ extending the language
of Robinson Arithmetic with additional non-logical constants.
Then we have to isolate K0, a recursively enumerable set of Q∗-
formulas, containing things expressible in Q∗ and known by a
certain person James. Now we can construct a formal system,
call it Q1, whose theorems are the sentences derivable from the
axioms of Robinson Arithmetic together with the sentences of
K0. Is Q1 consistent? Yes it is: the axioms of Q (Robinson
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Arithmetic) are true in the standard model, the things con-
tained in K0 are known by James and hence they are true, the
rules of inferences preserve truth, so every theorem of Q1 is
true. But in Q1, as it contains Robinson Arithmetic, we can
formulate the Gödel sentence G ↔ ¬Bew(G). Is G provable?
No, if it were, ¬Bew(G) would be provable, and so a falsity
would be provable contrary to the truth of every theorem of
Q1. Does James know G? No, G is not in K0, else it would
be provable in Q1. But I have just given a proof that G is not
provable, hence I know G, or G is contained in the set K1 of the
things that I know. If I were James, Anderson argues, it would
seem that we have to distinguish different levels of knowledge:
what I know at stage K0, and what I know at stage K1, after
reflecting on Gödel’s theorem.
The conclusion is that we have to distinguish levels of knowl-
edge –K0, K1, K2, ... – and this idea of levels of knowledge has to
be applied to the assumption number two, considered to be the
source of the Paradox. Anderson formalizes such a conclusion
with the following hierarchy of languages:
Languages. Let L = L(Q) be the language of Robinson Arith-
metic, we have:
L0 = L ∪ {K0, I0}1
Ln+1 = Ln ∪ {Kn+1, In+1}
Lω =
⋃
n∈ω Ln
So starting with the language of Robinson Arithmetic, An-
derson constructs a hierarchy of theories (Tn)n∈ω satisfying:
1Note that Anderson adds inferences predicates In to his hierarchy, but
he does it with minimal argument; this point is not, however, central to my
discussion.
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T0 = Q ∪

K0(α)→ α
K0(α) ∧ I0(α, β)→ K0(β)
Tn+1 = Tn ∪

Kn+1(α)→ α
Kn+1(Kn(α)→ α)
Kn+1(α) ∧ In+1(α, β)→ Kn+1(β)
where α and β ∈ Lω. As we can trivially see, the assumption
number two has now the form: Kn+1(Kn(α)→ α) which is al-
ways true, while Kn(Kn(α)→ α) is, in some cases, false. In
this way, Anderson avoids the Paradox of The Knower.
4. My criticism to Anderson’s solution
My criticism of Anderson’s solution is based on two argu-
ments: a principal and specific argument and a second general
argument which is inspired by S. Kripke’s article of 1975, [8].
The main argument can be succinctly expressed by the fol-
lowing sentence: I argue that, in his solution, which relies on a
certain relationship between knowledge and proof (see, section
2), Anderson confuses two different notions of proof: a syntac-
tic one and an absolute one. So in order to be able to explain
my criticism, firstly I have to introduce these two notions of
proof. The syntactic notion of proof is well known and it is
linked with the notion of formal system that is a set of sen-
tences, called the axioms of the system, together with a set of
relations on sentences, called the rules of inference of the sys-
tem. A proof of a sentence in a system, or a syntactic proof, is
a finite sequence of sentences, each of which either is an axiom
of the system, or is immediately deducible from the earlier ones
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by one of the rules of inferences. One of the possible interpreta-
tions of Gödel famous theorem deals with this notion of proof:
if a formal system satisfies certain conditions, there exists a for-
mula p such that neither p nor ¬p is formally provable in that
system. But in Myhill’s opinion (see [12]) there is another quite
interesting and problematic interpretation of Gödel’s theorem
which is expressible in the following way: for any formal sys-
tem S, adequate for the arithmetic of natural numbers, there
are correct inferences which cannot be formalized in S. So the
question is: what does Myhill mean when he uses the notion of
correct inferences? Let’s try to explain such a concept. When
a person uses some methods of proof, he is committed to the
validity of his methods of proof, otherwise he would be contra-
dicting himself. Hence if someone uses the means furnished by
the system of Peano Arithmetic (or Robinson Arithmetic) for
proving arithmetical statements, and is able to make explicit
those methods, 〈〈 he is ipso facto committed to the perfectly
definite proposition that the use of his methods cannot lead to
a false arithmetical statement 〉〉 ([12], p. 462). So let us consider
a person who uses the means furnished by the system of Peano
Arithmetic for proving arithmetical statements and who suc-
ceeds in making these means explicit. This person will be able
to reason as follows: the axioms of Peano Arithmetic are true
(he is committed to this, because he is committed to the valid-
ity of his proof methods), and the rules of inferences preserve
truth (idem), therefore every theorem of Peano Arithmetic is
true. Hence a false statement, such as 0 = 1, is not a theorem,
so (the arithmetization of) the statement that says that 0 = 1
is not a theorem is true. However, such reasoning cannot be
formalized in the system of Peano Arithmetic. It is thus not
a syntactic proof. It can only be thought of as a proof in a
different sense, which we will call, following Myhill’s definition,
absolute, and in this sense of proof the undecidable sentence p
is demonstrable.
Since I have clarified the meaning of the syntactic and the
absolute notion of proof, I am now able to explain my criticism
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to Anderson’s solution. At the beginning of his discussion, An-
derson adopts a notion of knowledge based on a formal notion
of proof: the set K0 of the things known by James is recursively
enumerable and contains Q, Robinson Arithmetic (as we will
see in a moment, K0 has to contain Q, otherwise James could
never be me, as Anderson wants). Hence James knows by a
syntactic notion of proof, and so, for what we have just said,
he doesn’t know the Gödel sentence G: nobody, who knows by
this sense of knowledge, could never know the Gödel sentence
G. So how could James know G? He has to use the proof I have
utilized for knowing G, but that kind of proof is not at all a syn-
tactic one: on the contrary is the sort of proof we have defined
as an absolute notion of proof. So Anderson’solution invites
two important questions. The first one is: how can Anderson
define, at the beginning of his argument, James’s knowledge
as knowledge based on a syntactic notion of proof, and then
adopt a definition of James’s knowledge based on an absolute
notion of proof ? The second one is: if Anderson had to give a
definition of the concept of knowledge, on which of the two no-
tions of proof would depend ? The trivial answer is that there
is no reason for changing the notion of proof on which James’s
knowledge is based, and that, therefore, Anderson cannot give
a definite and clear notion of knowledge.
This was the first argument against Anderson’s solution. Let
us now pass to the second and more general one. The second
argument I want to propose is based, as I have already said,
on the analogy with Kripke’s criticism of the Tarski’s idea of
introducing a hierarchy of languages each with its own predi-
cate of truth for the preceding language. In Kripke’s opinion,
Tarski’s theory goes against our intuitive usage of the predicate
“being true": in the natural language there is only one truth
predicate and not many. In the same way, we can argue against
Anderson’s solution that in the natural language we have only
one knowledge predicate. So the idea of introducing many lev-
els of knowledge is not only based on a incorrect argument, but
is also quite counterintuitive.
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5. The second solution: modal logic of provability.
The second solution is based on the idea of giving an epis-
temic interpretation of the modal logic of provability. Let us,
first, explain what is the modal logic of provability.
The modal logic of provability, developed only in the early
70’s and based on the two systems GL and GL∗, is a logic that
tries to answer the following question: can we capture the fea-
tures of the provability predicate Bew(x) in the framework of
modal logic? The positive answer to this question, given by R.
Solovay in 1976 [15], comes in the form of an equivalence be-
tween the system PA (Peano Arithmetic) and the two systems
GL and GL∗. In order to explain such an answer in a mathe-
matically precise way, we have to present the axiomatization of
GL and GL∗ and introduce the notions of realization and trans-
lation. GL is a normal system of modal logic characterized by
the two axiom schemata:
4 : 2α→ 22α
G : 2(2α→ α)→ 2α
On the other hand, the axioms of GL∗ are the theorems of
GL and all sentences of the form 2α → α (T), and the sole
rule of inference is modus ponens. GL∗ is not a normal system
of modal logic as it is not closed under the rule of necessitation.
Let us now introduce the two notions of realization and trans-
lation.
A realization is a function that assigns to each sentence letter
a sentence of the language of Peano Arithmetic.
A translation αφ of a modal sentence α under a realization φ is
defined inductively:
⊥φ = ⊥
pφ = φ(p)
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(α→ β)φ = (αφ → βφ)
(2α)φ = Bew(αφ)
These definitions allow us to express Solovay’s result:
GL ` α iff, for every φ, PA ` αφ
GL∗ ` α iff, for every φ, |=N αφ
The central idea of the second solution is to use the system
GL∗ (which is a consistent system of modal logic even if we add
the fixed point lemma) to resolve the Paradox of the Knower.
In order to develop such an idea, we have to give an epistemic
interpretation ofGL∗. Let us then considerGL∗, not as a modal
logic system, but as an idealized mathematician knower who has
a fairly complete knowledge of mathematics. The theorems of
GL∗, axiomatized by the principles we have given on page 9,
are exactly what our mathematician knows. Hence the set of
formulas he knows:
contains only, but not all, arithmetical truths (modulo
φ),
is closed under modus ponens.
Finally his knowledge has the following features:
K : it is closed under modus ponens,
T : it satisfies the reflection principle,
4 : if he knows something then he knows that he knows
it,
G : Our knower couldn’t be more modest about his
knowledge: he never knows to be sound with regard
to an unknown sentence (see [14], pp. 350-351).
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Remark that the modal logic of provability substitute the
problematic assumption number two, whose modal counterpart
we have designed with the axiom schemata U (see, p.3), with
the new axiom G. G has a form which is suitable for the obser-
vations we have made before: it does not affirm knowledge of
something, but it just describes a feature of knowledge as the
reflection principle and the principle of epistemic closure do. So
thanks to an idealized and abstract notion of knowledge and to
the consistent and decidable system GL∗, we menage to avoid
the Paradox of the (Mathematical) Knower.
6. The third solution: Egré’s solution
We arrive finally at the third and last solution, which tries
to connect the first two. Indeed P.Egré in his paper [8] arrives
at the conclusion of the section 5 above and then, instead of
stopping as he should, argues that there is a link between the
modal logic of provability and the first system of Anderson’s
hierarchy. What sort of connection does he propose? First of
all P. Egré affirms that GL∗ corresponds to PA+, where PA+
contains as axioms the theorems of PA and all sentences of the
form Bew(α)→ α, and it is closed under modus ponens. Then
he says that:
PA+ = T0
where T0 is the first system of Anderson’s hierarchy (see, p.6).
Hence in Egré’s opinion, Anderson’s solution and the solution
offered by the modal logic of provability are not so different: 〈〈
Anderson’s hierarchy is a generalization to all the finite degrees
of the separation of axiom schemata reflected in Solovay’s sys-
tem GL∗ 〉〉 ([8], p. 45). However this conclusion is incorrect. For
a start, it runs into the following technical problems. Namely,
we will show, contra Egré, that:
PA+ 6= T0
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In order to prove such a formula, we have to analyze the as-
sertion “GL∗ corresponds to PA+" which is quite unclear since
there is no notion of realization and translation, nor theorem
as the Solovay’s one. So there are two possible interpretations:
(1) (2α)φ = K(αφ)
Then PA+ 6= T0, for two reasons. The first one is that
PA+ contains the translation of the axiom schemata G and 4,
whereas T0 does not. The second reason is that PA+ contains
the translation of the distribution axiom schemata K which is
not equivalent to the principle of epistemic closure contained
in T0. In fact K is only equivalent to K(α) ∧ I(α, β)→ K(β),
in the presence of the translation of the rule of necessitation,
that is not, as we have already said, a rule of PA+. The other
possible interpretation is:
(2) (2α)φ = Bew(αφ)
Then PA+ 6= T0, for two reasons. The first one is that, as
before, PA+ does not contain a ‘real epistemic closure’ whereas
T 0 does. The second, and maybe more important reason, relies
on the tension between the following two facts. On the one
hand, as we have already said in section 1, in any arithmeti-
cal theory where we can define the proof predicate Bew(x) as
∃y.ProofT (y, x), Bew(x) satisfies the rule ` α ⇒ ` Bew(α).
On the other hand, we want the arithmetical theory PA+ to
contain a proof predicate Bew(x), defined as ∃y.ProofT (y, x),
which does not satisfy the rule ` α ⇒ ` Bew(α), since PA+
is the arithmetical counterpart of GL∗. It is clear that these
two facts are incompatible (it is no accident that the Solovay
theorem hold between GL∗ and the standard model, and not,
as for GL, between GL∗ and a formal system).
These technical weaknesses of Egré’solution may not be un-
related to the philosophical points underlined in the preceding
discussion. In fact the modal logic of provability and Ander-
son’s solution employ different means: while Anderson uses, in
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an illegitimate way, two notions of proof (the absolute one and
the syntactic one) to define knowledge, in the modal logic of
provability it’s clear that to know means to prove in a formal
system.
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